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The  federal  budget  is  important.  It  is  the  basis 
for planning  government  programs,  it is a significant 
element  in plans  of individuals  in the  private  sector, 
and  it  is the  starting  point  for  assessing  the  federal 
government’s  current  impact  on macroeconomic  con- 
ditions.  Past  budgets  are  used  to  study  significant 
economic  questions,  such  as  the  extent  to  which 
federal  fiscal  actions  affect  aggregate  output,  prices, 
and  interest  rates. 
The  traditional  statement  of  the  federal  budget 
provides  important  information  about  current  receipts 
and  expenditures,  but  is  nevertheless  incomplete. 
Actions  have  been  taken  that  will require  spending 
in the  future:  provision  for  that  future  spending  does 
not,  however,  appear  in the  budget  accounts.  As  a 
result,  stated  federal  spending  does  not  reveal  the 
total  resource  demands  placed  on  the  private 
economy  and  stated  federal  debt  does  not  reveal  the 
full tax  burden  that  taxpayers  will face  in the  future. 
In  other  words,  a  stealth  budget  that  is unseen  by 
most  observers  will  generate  future  taxing  and 
spending.’ 
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1 The  traditional  source  for  fiscal  information  is  Tire Budm  of 
tfie United  States  that  is prepared  by  the  Office  of Manage&en; 
and  Budget  (OMB)  for each  fiscal year.  Its presentation  of future 
liabilities  has  imoroved  in  recent  years.  The  1991  and  1992 
Budget  each  comain  a section  that  i’s  analogous  to  the  footnotes 
in  acorporate  annual  report;  that  section-discusses  many,  but 
not  all.  of the  unfunded  liabilities  discussed  in this  oaner.  The  .  . 
content  of that  section  has  also changed  between  the  two  years, 
and  has changed  from  similar  information  presented  in the  Special 
Analyses  book  in  the  set  of  budget  documents  for  prior  years. 
There  is no  summary  table  that  has  been  consistently  presented 
over  time  that  would  facilitate  discussion  of the  future  resource 
demands  that  the  federal  government  has  committed  to placing 
on  persons  and  firms  in  the  future. 
The  stealth  budget  is  not  trivial.  The  programs 
discussed  in  this  paper  had  unfunded  liabilities  in 
1989  in  excess  of  $4  trillion.  To  put  that  number 
in perspective,  the  conventionally  stated  gross federal 
debt  in  that  year  was  less  than  $3  trillion. 
Although  the  conventional  federal  budget  omits 
important  information  when  unfunded  liabilities  are 
present,  there  is  a  straightforward  alternative  that 
would  produce  a more  revealing  budget:  explicitly 
state  the  present  value  of expected  future  spending 
when  a program  is created.  In  addition,  each  future 
budget  could  restate  that  amount  due  to  either  the 
passage  of  time  or  legislative  revisions. 
The  next  section  of  this  paper  will  discuss  some 
of the  federal  programs  that  have  created  unfunded 
liabilities.  The  focus  will be  on  only  those  programs 
(1) that  promise  specific  benefits  to  specific  persons 
and thus  resemble  private  contracts,2  or (2) for which 
current  or  past  actions  make  future  action  unavoid- 
able.  Deposit  insurance,  for  example,  promises  an 
exact  benefit  to  particular  deposit  holders;  and  the 
creation  of nuclear  waste  as a byproduct  of weapons 
production  makes  disposal  or  treatment  essential. 
Other  federal  spending  programs  that  predictably  pay 
benefits  but  are  not  embodied  in current  legislation 
will  not  be  considered.  For  example,  if  a  drought 
reduces  crop  yields,  it  is virtually  certain  that  Con- 
gress  will  enact  a  payment  scheme;  the  exact 
payments  to  particular  individuals,  however,  are 
impossible  to  guess. 
SPECIFIC  PROGRAMS 
Many  programs  that  create  unfunded  liabilities 
will be  discussed  in this  section.  Each  will be  briefly 
2 Legislated  promises  are  of  course  not  exactly  equivalent  to 
private  contracts.  An  individual  may  not  voluntarily  agree  to 
participate  in  a program  such  as  Social  Security  but  may  still 
be  compelled  to  participate.  Also,  if  the  government  later 
reneges  on  its promises,  there  is often  no  legal  recourse  for  the 
individual. 
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funded  liabilities  can  be  at  least  roughly  estimated, 
an estimate  will appear  in Table  1 and  the  method- 
ology  will  be  briefly  explained.  Each  entry  will  be 
a present  value  of expected  future  real payments  by 
the  government,  net  of expected  future  real receipts, 
as of the  end  of the  government’s  1989  fiscal year.3 
In other  cases  the  source  of possible  taxpayer  liability 
will  be  mentioned  in  Table  2. 
To  understand  most  of  the  programs  listed  it  is 
important  to  distinguish  between  fiscal  actions  and 
financial  intermediation.  Any  program  that  is .in 
essence  a combination  of taxing  and  spending  is  a 
fiscal  program.  Many  federal  fiscal  programs  are 
obscured  by  being  described  in  the  language  of 
insurance  or  banking.  For  example,  a  bona  fide 
insurance  company  will attempt  to set premiums  on 
an  actuarial  basis  and  will  hold  sufficient  reserves 
to  pay  expected  future  claims.  A  fiscal  program 
masquerading  as an  insurance  program  will set  low 
premiums  that  have  little  relation  to  risk  and  are 
insufficient  to  cover  the  expected  value  of  future 
payments.  Similarly,  a commercial  lender  will attempt 
to charge  sufficient  interest  or other  fees  to compen- 
sate  for  any  credit  risk;  a  disguised  fiscal  program 
will  lend  at  low  rates  to  poor  risks. 
Why  is the  language  so  obscure?  The  Appendix 
to  this  paper  presents  some  elements  of  political 
economy  that  help  explain  the  incentives  for elected 
officials  to  use  language  that  fails  to  reveal  the  full 
cost  of  many  programs. 
3 Pment  etahe  is the  value  of  a  future  stream  of  cash  flows 
adjusted  for  the  time  value  of  money.  For  example,  a  single 
payment  P  received  in  N  years  over  which  the  market  rate  of 
interest  is R would  have  a present  value P( 1 +R)  -N.  For  a series 
of payments  the  individual  items  can  simply  be  added  together. 
To  adjust  for inflation  it is often  helpful  to express  the  cash  flow 
in  constant  dollars,  or  in rea/ terms;  a series  of real  cash  flows 
is  properly  adjusted  by  using  a  real interest  rate, which  is  the 
difference  between  a market  rate  of interest  and  expected  infla- 
tion.  In  this  paper  a  real  rate  of  4  percent  is  used  in  several 
calculations,  reflecting  a market  rate  of 8 percent  and  expected 
inflation  of 4 percent-Those  values  are  approximately  correct 
for  Sentember  1989.  the  narticular  noint  in  time  that  is  used 
for  the  calculations.’  Uncertainty  is’ addressed  by  looking  at 
eqoecred cash  flows.  An  expected  value  is  the  product  of  the 
value  if some  event  occurs  times  the  probability  of that  event 
occurring;  those  products  are  then  calculated  and  added  over 
all possible  events.  For  example,  if you  receive  a dollar  if a coin 
flin is heads  and  a dime  if it is tails.  the  exoected  value  of a coin 
fl;b  is  5.5 cents. 
-Ry using  these  definitions,  one  can compute  values  that  make 
sense  when  thev  are  added  together.  The  entries  in  Table  1 
are  all present  values  of  expecyed  real  cash  flows. 
Towe  (1990)  has  a good  discussion  that  relates  present  values 
of expected  cash  flows  to government  budgets,  particularly  his 
section  on  the  “actuarial  balance”  of particular  programs. 
Deposit  Insurance 
Deposit  insurance  has  become  a  well-known 
example  of  the  type  of  program  that  can  create 
future  liabilities.  It  was  first  offered  by  the  federal 
government  in the  1930s  and is now  raising  the  level 
of  federal  spending.  In  some  years  the  insurance 
system  was labled “off-budget”  and therefore  was not 
included  in  spending  and  deficit  calculations.  In 
other  years  cash  payments  and  expenditures  were 
included  in  the  budget,  but  no  mention  was  made 
of  rapidly  growing  future  taxpayer  liabilities  for 
deposits  in  insolvent  institutions.  When  major 
changes  in the  law raised  the  expected  value  of future 
payments  to  insured  depositors,  such  as  the  1980 
increase  in  the  amount  of  deposits  covered,  those 
higher  payments  did  not  raise  stated  spending  or 
debt.  Even  today  the  budgeted  liability  understates 
the  likely  total  taxpayer  expenditure. 
Deposits  up to $100,000  at banks,  savings and loan 
associations,  and  credit  unions  are explicitly  insured 
by federal  agencies.  In addition,  the  Federal  Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  has  treated  large 
banks  as “too  big  to fail” and  has  extended  de  facto 
insurance  to  uninsured  depositors  and  other 
creditors.4  Prior  to  1989  legislation  (the  Financial 
Institutions  Reform,  Recovery,  and  Enforcement 
Act,  or  FIRREA)  depositors  at  savings  and  loan 
associations  were  insured  by the  Federal  Savings  and 
Loan  Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC);  they  are  now 
insured  by  the  FDIC’s  new  Savings  Association  In- 
surance  Fund.  Bank  depositors  who  were  insured  by 
the  FDIC  are  now  covered  by  the  FDIC’s  Bank  In- 
surance  Fund.  Credit  union  depositors  are  insured 
by  the  National  Credit  Union  Association’s  Share 
Insurance  Fund. 
Sawings  and  Loan  Associations  The  FIRREA 
acknowledged  a liability  of $115  billion  over  three 
years,  to be paid by taxpayers  and by higher  insurance 
fees.  Many  assumptions  behind  that  number  were 
too  optimistic,  however.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  (Brady  1990)  has  estimated  that  costs  will 
be  between  $90  billion  and  $130  billion,  in addition 
to  funds  already  spent. 
The  way  that  such  a large  liability  was  accrued  is 
instructive  and  will  briefly  be  described  below.5 
FSLIC  insurance  was established  in  1934;  it allowed 
4 Todd  and  Thompson  (1990)  describe  the  logic  and  evolution 
of  the  idea  that  some  banks  are  too  big  to  fail. 
5 For  more  complete  discussions,  see  Benston  and  Kaufman 
(1990)  or  Dotsey  and  Kuprianov  (1990). 
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their  leverage,  thereby  increasing  their  returns  but 
also  increasing  the  risk  that  they  would  not  be  able 
to make  promised  payments  to depositors  and  other 
creditors,  Holding  short-term  liabilities and long-term 
assets  with  fixed  returns,  the  industry  was  especi- 
ally  vulnerable  to  interest  rate  risk.  In  the  1970s 
nominal  interest  rates  rose  sharply  and  reduced 
asset  values  and  the  net  worth  of the  industry;  the 
market  value  of many  associations  became  negative. 
The  political  system  responded  perversely.  First,  the 
problem  was  denied-accounting  procedures  were 
altered  to  obscure  the  losses  that  had  already  oc- 
curred.  Second,  the  problem  was  worsened-the 
Monetary  Control  Act  in  1980  raised  the  amount  of 
insurance  coverage  from  $40,000  per  account  to 
$100,000,  thereby  making  it  easier  for  insolvent 
institutions  to  raise  funds.  By  1982  much  of  the 
savings  and  loan  industry  was  economically  insol- 
vent.6  A  policy  of  regulatory  forbearance  kept  in- 
solvent  institutions  from  being  closed.  They  were 
instead  allowed  to  make  risky  loans  funded  by  in- 
sured  deposits.  Many  of  the  risky  loans  failed  and 
thus  further  raised  the  taxpayer  burden  that  is now 
being  recognized. 
The  entry  in Table  1 for unfunded  savings and loan 
insurance  is  $130  billion.  It  represents  the  upper 
bound  of the  Treasury  Secretary’s  admitted  range, 
which  was  stated  in  1989  dollars.  The  upper  bound 
is  used  since  all  previous  official  estimates  have 
substantially  understated  the cost of deposit  insurance 
for  savings  and  loan  associations.  That  estimate  is 
consistent  with  others  prepared  by  independent 
analysts;  one  range  was  given  as  $86.5  billion  to 
$136.4  billion  (Brumbaugh,  Carron,  and  Litan, 
1989).  Confusing  the  issue  are competing  estimates 
that  add  in future  nominal  interest  costs  that  would 
result  from  borrowing  the  funds  to be  spent.  Those 
estimates  are difficult  to interpret  and  are ignored  in 
this  paper. 
The  official  estimates  may  still  be  conservative. 
The  perverse  incentives  created  by deposit  insurance 
still exist.  Also,  the  solvency  of existing  thrift  institu- 
tions  is often  overstated  by  conventional  accounting 
6 Economicah’y  in~o&nt  means  that  the  market  value of liabilities, 
including  deposits,  is greater  than  the  market  value of assets  such 
as loans.  It is possible  for an  institution  to be  solvent  according 
to an accounting  system,  but  to be economically  insolvent.  This 
could  occur  if  loans  are  assigned  higher  values  than  realistic 
estimates  of future  cash  flows,  or if assets  such  as goodwill  are 
given  positive  values  on the  balance  sheet  but  not  in-the  market. 
According  to Benston  and  Kaufman  (1990),  “By 1982 some  two- 
thirds  of the  [savings-and-loan]  industry  was  economically  in- 
solvent,  with  aggregate  negative  net  worth  of about  $100  billion.” 
Table  1 
Unfunded  Liabilities  of the  Federal  Government 
Billions  of  1989  Dollars 
Program 
Savings  and  loan  deposit  insurance 
Social  Security 
130 
Retirement  and  disability  benefits 
Health  benefits 
Railroad  retirement 
Federal  employee  retirement  and 
disability  benefits 
Civil  service 
Military 
Medical  benefits 
Pension  Benefit  Guarantee  Fund 
Crop  insurance 
Flood  insurance 
Defense  nuclear  waste  disposal 
Loans  and  loan  guarantees  by 












Total  4,250 
Note:  The  sources  of the  estimates  are  described  in the  text.  Each  estimate 
is  the  present  value  at  the  end  of  the  government’s  1989  fiscal 
year  of  expected  real  future  spending  net  of  any  offsetting  receipts. 
procedures.  Until  those  factors  change  it  is  likely 
that  some  thrifts  will create  additional  liabilities  for 
Savings Association  Insurance  Fund  and the taxpayer. 
In  addition,  the  official  estimates  assume  that  the 
assets  of failed  associations  will be  sold  in a prompt 
and  efficient  manner.  Kane  (199 1  a),  however, 
estimates  that  the  disposal  agency,  the  Resolution 
Trust  Corporation,  cost  taxpayers  $40  billion  in its 
first  year  of operation  by  mismanaging  the  assets  of 
failed  savings  and  loan  associations,  with  additional 
costs  likely  in  the  future. 
Banks  The  banking  industry  shares  some  im- 
portant  similarities  with the  savings  and loan industry 
several  years  ago. 
(1)  Deposit  insurance  has  given  banks  the 
incentive  to  lower  their  holdings  of  capital. 
(2)  Poorly  capitalized  banks  are  allowed  to 
stay  in  business.  One  study  found  30  banks 
without  any  capital  on  a risk-adjusted  basis  in 
mid-1989,  and  another  31  with  capital  below 
3  percent  of  deposits  (Brumbaugh  and  Litan, 
1990).  That  study  was  based  on  conventional 
accounting  data. 
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value  rather  than  market  value.  Many  banks 
have  thereby  overstated  asset  values.  Loans  to 
impoverished  third-world  governments,  for ex- 
ample,  are  routinely  traded  in private  markets 
at  lower  values  than  are  recognized  by  some 
large  banks. 
(4)  Barriers  to  branching  result  in loan  port- 
folios  that  are  not  regionally  diversified  and  are 
therefore  vulnerable  to  localized  shocks  to  the 
economy.  Just  as banks  and  savings  and  loans 
in Texas  in the  mid-1980s  were  vulnerable  to 
the  weak  regional  economy,  banks  in the  North- 
east  are  now  feeling  effects  of  a  regional  eco- 
nomic  downturn. 
(5)  The  FDIC  is  paying  more  to  close  in- 
solvent  banks  than  it is receiving  in premiums. 
In  1990  the  bank  insurance  fund  lost  $3.5 
billion,  in  1989  it  lost  $2.0  million,  and  in 
1988  it  lost  $4.2  billion.’ 
The  parallels  with  the  thrift  industry  are  not 
exact.  Many  observers  (for example,  Th  Economist 
[ 199 11  and analysts  quoted  in Rehm  [ 199 lb])  believe 
that  on  average  banks  are  more  profitable,  better 
capitalized,  better  managed,  and better  regulated  than 
were  savings  and  loan  associations  in the  1970s  and 
1980s. 
Without  detailed  knowledge  of the  market  value 
of individual  banks’  assets  and  liabilities,  it is impos- 
sible  to  estimate  losses  the  FDIC  will  incur.  It  is 
therefore  impossible  to  estimate  the  expected  loss 
to  taxpayers  due  to  insurance  of bank  deposits  and 
other  liabilities.  One  estimate,  Kane  (1991b),  puts 
the  cost  to taxpayers  at roughly  $40  billion.  A more 
optimistic  view  has  been  stated  by  the  head  of the 
FDIC,  in  essence  that  the  present  value  of  future 
bank  premiums  for deposit  insurance  is large  enough 
to  close  insolvent  banks,  pay  liability  holders,  and 
rebuild  the  Bank  Insurance  Fund.  This  view  is also 
held  by  Ely  (quoted  in  Kleege  [ 19911)  who  stated 
“Losses  of this  amount  [$ZO to  $40  billion  to  close 
insolvent  banks  in the  near  future]  . . . can  be  fully 
paid  by  the  banking  industry.” 
No  estimate  of taxpayer  liability is therefore  made. 
Instead,  the  face  value  of insurance  provided  banks 
7 These  historical  figures  describing  the  Bank  Insurance  Fund 
are  from  the  Budget  for  1991  and  1992  (1991,  Section  Two, 
p.  1115,  and  1992,  Part  Four,  p.  1105). 
is entered  in Table  2,  consisting  of the.deposits  of 
the  banking  system  at  the  end  of  1989.8 
Cllpdit Unions  Credit  unions  also  offer  insured 
deposits.  According  to  one  study,9  although  86 
insolvent  credit  unions  are  being  allowed  to  remain 
open,  another  122 have  very  low capital,  and another 
294  have  substandard  capital,  their  insurance  fund 
is  unlikely  to  require  taxpayer  assistance.  Table  1 
therefore  contains  no entry  for credit  unions.  Their 
total  deposits  are  listed  in Table  2 as an  insured  lia- 
bility  of  the  government. 
Social  Security 
In  1935  the  Social  Security  system  was  founded 
as  a mandatory  old-age  pension  plan  with  benefits 
loosely  based  on  prior  taxable  earnings.  Benefits, 
the  tax  base,  and  tax  rates  have  been  substantially 
increased  over  time.  The  most  notable  increase 
in  benefits  occurred  when  health  insurance  was 
introduced  in  1965.  The  system  has  always  had 
unfunded  liabilities.  At  times  the  payroll  tax  collec- 
tions  were  so  far  below  benefit  levels  that  the 
necessity  for major change  was obvious.  The  last such 
occurrence  was  in  1983,  when  Congress  cut  pro- 
jected  future  benefits  and  substantially  raised  taxes. 
The  system  is now  enjoying  record  annual  surpluses 
of  cash  receipts  over  expenditures. 
Despite  its  apparent  prosperity,  many  estimates 
show  substantial  future  liabilities for the  system.  The 
trust  fund  for  hospital  insurance  is projected  to  be 
exhausted  by  2006.  lo At  that  point,  current  taxes 
will  not  pay  current  benefits  and  there  will  be  no 
cushion  to  draw  on.  And  as the  baby  boom  genera- 
tion  begins  to receive  retirement  benefits,  the  retire- 
ment  and  disability  funds  will also decline  and  even- 
tually  become  exhausted. 
The  1992  Budget  contains  a range  of estimates  for 
the  present  value  of future  liabilities  for the  Old  Age 
and  Survivors  Insurance  and the  Disability  Insurance 
Funds.  Using  a’midrange  set of actuarial  assumptions, 
* On  the  one  hand,  deposits  over  $100,000  in  banks  that  are 
not  too  big  to fail are  incorrectly  included  in that  entry.  On  the 
other  hand,  some  nondeposit  debt  of banks  that  are  too  big .to 
fail is  implicitly  insured  and  is  incorrectly  excluded  from  that 
entry.  The  entry  in Table  2 is therefore  at best  an approximation. 
9 The  study  by  James  R.  Barth  and  R.  Dan  Brumbaugh  is 
discussed  in  Rehm  (1991a). 
r” The  source  for this  estimate  and  most  others  in  this  section 
is the  1992 Budget,  Part  II, Chapter  VIIIb.  A fuller explanation 
of  the  programs  is  given  by  Aaron,  Bosworth,  and  Burtless 
(1989). 
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Over  the  next  7.5 years  the  present  value  of  that 
deficit is $1,174  billion. The  entry  in Table  1, $1,052 
billion,  is that  value  augmented  for losses  more  than 
75  years  out,  restated  as  a present  value  in  1989. 
The  Federal  Hospital  Insurance  Trust  Fund  pays 
certain  medical  expenses  of  elderly  Americans. 
Despite  increases  in the  payroll  tax  rate  and  the  tax 
base,  spending  is growing  faster  than  revenues  due 
to  a growing  elderly  population  and  rapid  growth  in 
the  cost of providing  medical  care.  One  Treasury  pro- 
jection  put  the  expected  future  deficit  for  this  pro- 
gram  at  $312  billion  in  1989.  Another  medical 
care  program,  Supplemental  Medical  Insurance,  is 
funded  primarily  by  general  revenues.  Spending  for 
that  program  was  $33  billion  in  1990  and  has  been 
growing  rapidly.  Assuming  that  spending  growth  for 
that  program  is only  one  percent  higher  than  infla- 
tion,  the  present  value  of spending  for  Supplemen- 
tal  Medical  Insurance  is  $1.1  trillion.  The  com- 
bined  amount  for health  insurance  is $1,4  12 billion 
and  is  entered  in Table  1. 
Another  unfunded  liability  is a retirement  pension 
program  for railroad  employees.  With  three  retirees 
receiving  benefits  for every  employee  currently  pay- 
ing  taxes,  benefit  payments  are  much  larger  than 
receipts.  The  Railroad  Retirement  Board  has  re- 
ceived  congressional  assistance  five times  in the  last 
16 years.  The  1992  Budget  contains  an estimate  of 
the  unfunded  liability  of  $34  billion.  That  value, 
restated  for  1989,  is  listed  in Table  1. 
Estimates  of  future  Social  Security  taxes  and 
spending  are  very  sensitive  to economic  and  demo- 
graphic  assumptions  such  as population  and produc- 
tivity  growth,  health-care  expenses,  interest  rates, 
and life expectancy.  Any estimated  liabilities are thus 
extremely  imprecise.  Perhaps  more  important  is the 
possibility  of major  changes  in the  programs.  If the 
economic  assumptions  are not terribly  inaccurate,  the 
growing  size  of future  deficits  may  lead  to  substan- 
tial  changes  in  taxes,  benefits,  and  even  the  struc- 
ture  of  the  medical  care  industry. 
Federal  Employee  Retirement  Benefits 
Federal  employees  are  promised  retirement  and 
disability  benefits,  as  are  many  private  sector 
workers.  Unlike  private  firms,  the  government  does 
not  fully  accrue  reserves  to  pay  those  benefits  for 
workers  hired  before  1985.  Also,  in some  ways  the 
benefits  are more  generous  than  those  of most  private 
firms.  For  example,  many  federal  pensions  are fully 
indexed  for  inflation.  The  effect  is  that  the  cost  of 
federal  programs  is understated  as  the  full person- 
nel  costs  are  not  recognized. 
Table  1 contains  an entry  of $643  billion for civilian 
employee  retirement  and  disability  benefits,  which 
is taken  from  the  1992  Budget.  That  amount  repre- 
sents  the  excess  of the present  value of expected  plan 
benefits  over  net  assets  available  for  benefits.  The 
funding  of retirement  benefits  for military  personnel 
differs  in  several  details  from  the  civilian  program. 
The  1992  Budget,  nonetheless,  estimates  an  un- 
funded  deficit  of $513  billion  for pre-1985  service. 
That  value  is  also  listed  in  Table  1. 
Federal  retirees  also  receive  subsidized  health 
insurance.  Agencies’  budgets  include  payments  for 
persons  who  have  already  retired  but  make  no  pro- 
vision for future  payments  for current  employees.  An 
admittedly  rough  estimate  of the present  value of that 
amount  is $155  billion,  the  midpoint  of a range  given 
in  the  1992  Budget.  No  estimate  is  made  in  that 
document  for health  benefits  for retired  military  per- 
sonnel,  which  include  essentially  free  care  in many 
cases  at military  facilities.  Table  1 presents  a rough 
estimate  that  the  unfunded  liability  for  health  care 
for  military  retirees  has  the  same  proportion  to 
unfunded  civilian health  care as the  unfunded  military 
retirement  program  has  to  the  civilian  retirement 
program. 
Insurance  of  Private  Pensions 
The  Pension  Benefit  Guaranty  Corporation 
(PBGC)  insures  defined  benefit  pension  payments 
promised  by private  firms  to their  workers.  In  1989 
almost  40 million  persons  were  insured,  with  prom- 
ised  benefits  near  $750  billion.  Although  most 
defined  benefit  plans  were  clearly solvent,  some  were 
obviously  underfunded. 
Before  legislation  passed  in  1987  took  effect,  a flat 
premium  per covered  worker  was charged.  Premiums 
now  vary according  to book  values  of plan  assets  and 
liabilities,  but  are not  completely  set  on  an actuarial 
basis.  Based  on plans  already  terminated  the  PBGC 
has  a  deficit  of  more  than  $1  billion;  the  effect  of 
future  pension  plan  terminations  has  been  projected 
by many  observers  to greatly  exceed  future  premium 
payments  at  current  levels. 
Hirtle  and  Estrella  (1990)  have  simulated  pension 
plan  behavior  by  using  Compustat  data  for  1,s 12 
firms  that  employ  almost  20 million  workers.  They 
estimated  that  plans  of those  firms  would  generate 
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years  with  a  present  value  of  $27  billion;  future 
premiums,  however,  would  have  a present  value  of 
$12  billion.  Future  plan terminations,  therefore,  have 
a present  value  of  $15  billion. 
That  estimate  may  be  conservative.  First,  it does 
not  cover  all  insured  workers.  Hirtle  and  Estrella 
point  out  that  as  many  as  31  million  workers  may 
be  covered.  Second,  their  simulations’do  not  allow 
for formation  of new  firms  with  defined  benefit  pen- 
sion  plans  that  may  become  insolvent  in the  future. 
Third,  their  dynamic  models  do not allow for strategic 
behavior  in response  to  incentives.  For  example,  a 
firm  near  insolvency  has  the  incentive  to undertake 
risky  behavior.  If  the  risks  pay  off,  managers  and 
equity  owners  will receive  a large  return.  If the  risks 
fail,  creditors,  including  the  PBGC,  will bear  most 
of the  loss.  All three  effects  would  make  the  PBGC’s 
unfunded  liability  even  greater. 
Another  possibility  is  raised  by  the  voluntary 
termination  of  defined  benefit  pension  plans,  with 
accrued  benefits  replaced  with  annuities  issued  by 
insurance  companies  that  may  have  low  quality 
assets.  Although  the  PBGC  does  not  recognize  an 
obligation  to insure  such  benefits,  others  believe  that 
a legal  or political  obligation  does  exist;  in that  case 
the  PBGC  has  stated  that  such  an  obligation  would 
add  “tens  of  billions”  to  the  liabilities  already  in- 
sured  (Rose  and  Wessel,  1990).  That  amount  is not 
included  in  the  tables. 
The  total  unfunded  liability  of  the  PBGC  for 
single-employer  defined  benefit  pension  plans  can 
therefore  be  estimated  as  $b  16  billion.  The  largest 
part  is  the  estimate  of  Hirtle  and  Estrella  for  the 
unfunded  cost  of future plan terminations,  $15  billion. 
Adding  $1  billion  for  the  deficit  from  past  termina- 
tions  yields  a  $16  billion  estimate. 
Other  Insurance  Programs” 
The  government  has  several  other  programs  that 
are  described  in  the  language  of  insurance.  Each 
promises  payments  if certain  events  occur,  collects 
periodic  receipts,  and may subject  taxpayers  to future 
payments  if receipts  fail to cover  expenditures.  Some 
of the  programs  include  flood  insurance  for  owners 
of buildings  in flood-prone  areas,  crop  insurance,  war- 
risk  insurance  for airplane  and  ship owners,  political- 
risk  insurance  for certain  foreign  investment  projects 
*I This  section  is based  primarily  on the  1992 Budget,  Part Two, 
Chapter  VIIIa. 
owned  by U.S.  corporations,  and eight  life insurance 
programs  for  military  veterans. 
The  actuarial  soundness  of the  programs  can  be 
hard  to assess.  Crop  insurance  has recently  been  sub- 
sidized  at the  rate  of roughly  one  billion  dollars  per 
year.  The  program’s  managers  are  attempting  to 
lower  the  federal  subsidy  as a fraction  of receipts  but 
are also attempting  to raise  the  fraction  of crops  that 
are  insured.  The  two  changes  would  tend  to  have 
offsetting  effects  on  total  federal  spending.  The 
estimate  in Table  1 therefore  ignores  those  changes 
and  is  simply  the  present  value  of  current  average 
subsidy  payments. 
The  entry  in Table  1 also  contains  an amount  for 
flood  insurance.  That  estimate  was  prepared  by  the 
agency  running  the  program,  and  is the  amount  that 
would  be needed  to satisfy policyholder  claims in nine 
out  of ten  decades.  For  the  other  insurance  programs 
mentioned  above  there  is  no  estimate  in Table  1. 
Instead  the  face  value  of  the  programs  is included 
in  Table  2. 
Nuclear  Waste  from  Weapons  Production’2 
The  Department  of Energy  is responsible  for 280 
facilities  in the  nuclear  weapons  production  program. 
Many  of the  facilities were  built in the  1940s  or  1950s 
and  are obsolete.  Unavoidable  future  costs  have  thus 
been  created;  some  examples  follow.  Two  facilities 
have  nearly  100  million  gallons  of high-level  wastes 
in “temporary”  storage  containers  awaiting permanent 
storage.  Leaks  in those  containers  have  been  a con- 
tinuing  problem,  making  the  necessity  for a perma- 
nent  storage  method  clear.  In  addition  to  leaks  of 
high-level  wastes,  low-level  waste  has  been  put 
directly  into  the  ground.  Substantial  soil and ground- 
water  contamination  has thus  occurred  at several  sites 
and  needs  to  be  cleaned  up.  Also,  an  older  nuclear 
reactor  has  been  taken  out  of service  to  avoid  sub- 
stantial  safety expenditures;  its dismantling  is another 
unfunded  liability. 
It is not  clear  what  disposal  and  cleanup  methods 
will eventually  be  used.  As the  Secretary  of Energy 
put  it, “Today’s  technology  is not  sufficiently  mature 
or cost-effective  to assure  meeting  either  the  Depart- 
ment’s  goals  or the  efficient  use  of public  resources” 
(Department  of  Energy,  1989).  As  a  result,  any 
estimated  cost  is highly  uncertain.  In  1988  congres- 
sional  testimony,  one  Energy  Department  employee 
‘2 This  section  is based  on Alvarez  and Makhijani  (1988),  United 
States  General  Accounting  Office  (1988),  and  United  States 
Department  of  Energy  (1989). 
* 
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ing  Office  later  gave  a range  of $lOO-$130  billion. 
Apparently,  neither  is  a present  value,  but  instead 
represents  spending  over  a lengthy  period.  To  state 
the numbers  in the  same  form as the rest of the paper, 
it is assumed  that  outlays  of $5 billion per year  (1989 
dollars)  for  20 years  will dispose  of existing  nuclear 
waste  and  put  abandoned  production  sites  in  con- 
formity  with  civilian  environmental  standards.  The 
present  value  is  $68  billion.  It  should  be  empha- 
sized  that  it  is  a very  imprecise  estimate. 
Loans  and  Loan  Guarantees’3 
Many  government  agencies  have  made  loans  to 
individuals  and firms; the outstanding  volume  in 1989 
was  $207  billion.  Programs  with  more  than  $10 
billion  of outstanding  debt  include  foreign  military 
sales,  agricultural  credit  insurance,  rural  housing 
insurance,  agricultural  export  credit,  and  rural  elec- 
tric  and  telephone  utilities.  There  are  also  a host  of 
smaller  loan  programs. 
The  outstanding  volume  of direct  loans  has  been 
declining,  but  has  been  more  than  replaced  by loan 
guarantees.  Federal  agencies  guaranteed  $588  billion 
of primary  credit  (that  is, net of secondary  loan pools) 
at the  end  of  1989.  Programs  generating  more  than 
$10  billion  of loan guarantees  include  student  loans, 
loans to small businesses,  and housing  loans from  the 
Federal  Housing  Administration  (FHA),  the  Govern- 
ment  National  Mortgage  Association,  and  the 
Veterans  Administration  (VA). 
Government  loans  and  loan  guarantees  enable 
recipients  to  obtain  credit  on  better  terms  than 
would  be  available  in private  markets.  Some  favored 
parties  include  poor  credit  risks  and other  borrowers 
who  commit  less collateral for government  credit  than 
would  be required  by private  creditors.  Government 
lending  to such  parties  creates  an obvious  credit  risk 
for  taxpayers.  The  failure  to  provide  adequate  loan 
loss  reserves  for  outstanding  loans  certainly  creates 
an  unfunded  liability. 
An  example  of  a lending  agency  creating  an  un- 
funded  liability is the  Farmers  Home  Administration 
(FmHA).  The  agency  lends  to  farmers  unable  to 
obtain  credit  from  normal  commercial  lenders.  Ac- 
cording  to one  report,r4  many  of the  borrowers  lose 
I3 This  section  and  the  next  two  sections  are  primarily  based 
on  the  Special  Analyses  documents  (1989  and  1990),  General 
Accounting  Office  (1989),  and  the  1992  Budget. 
I4 The  General  Accounting  Office  report  is  cited  in  Bovard 
(1988). 
money  due  to poor  farming  practices,  such  as inade- 
quate  care  of livestock  and crops,  or planting  on poor 
land.  After  defaulting  on an FmHA  loan,  such  a bor- 
rower  is then  able to obtain  new  loans  from  the  same 
agency.  According  to the  1991  Budget,  the  FmHA 
credit  fund  had  therefore  reached  a  negative  net 
worth  of  $28  billion. 
The  1992  Budget  contains  estimates  for the  value 
of expected  losses  on loans and loan guarantees  made 
in  1990  and  before.  For  direct  loans  the  expected 
loss  rate  is 23.4  percent  of the  amount  of outstand- 
ing loans.  For  loan guarantees  the  expected  loss rate 
is 4.8  percent.  Each  loss  rate  is then  applied  to  the 
volume  of outstanding  loans  at the  end  of  1989  and 
the  figure  entered  in  Table  1. 
Those  figures  do  not  include  many  activities  of 
government-sponsored  enterprises  (GSEs),  which 
had  lent  $763  billion  through  1989.r5  GSEs  are 
organizations  that  have  federal  charters  and  some 
degree  of private  ownership  mixed  with  some  degree 
of government  control.  Prominent  GSEs  include  the 
Federal  National  Mortgage  Association,  the  Federal 
Home  Loan  Banks,  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Mort- 
gage  Corporation,  the  Student  Loan  Marketing 
Association,  the  Farm  Credit  Banks,  and the  Federal 
Agricultural  Mortgage  Corporation.  Debt  issued  by 
a GSE  does  not  have  explicit  backing  by the  govern- 
ment  but  is  widely  believed  to  have  an  implicit 
guarantee.  Evidence  of this  implicit  guarantee  can 
be  seen  in credit  markets,  where  GSE  debt  carries 
a higher  interest  rate than  comparable  Treasury  debt, 
but  a  lower  rate  than  the  safest  corporate  debt. 
As with. any  financial  intermediary,  a GSE  is sub- 
ject  to credit  and interest  rate  risk.  The  1992  Budget 
judges  those  risks  to  the  taxpayers  from  current 
operations  to be  small. No  attempt  is therefore  made 
to  estimate  any  taxpayer  liability  that  might  occur 
due  to  GSE  activity;  the  amount  of their  lending  is 
listed  in  Table  2. 
There  remains  the  risk  that  a GSE  could  change 
its  management  strategy  in ways  that  increase  risks 
to the  taxpayer.  That  potential  has  led  to proposals 
to  lessen  or  eliminate  that  risk.  They  include  full 
privatization,  increased  capital  requirements,  or the 
mandatory  issuance  by  GSEs  of subordinated  debt 
that  is  explicitly  not  guaranteed. 
1s A good  explanation  of the  structure  of GSEs  and  the  evalua- 
tion  of their  financial  risk  is given  by  the  Congressional  Budget 
Office  (1991). 
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Sources  of Possible  Liabilities 
of the  Federal  Government 
Billions  of  1989  Dollars 
Insured 
Program  Amount 
Insurance  of  bank  deposits  2,175 
Insurance  of  credit  union  deposits  164 
War-risk  insurance  239 
Veterans  life  insurance  27 
Political-risk  insurance  of  direct  investments  abroad  9 
Lending  of  government-sponsored  enterprises  763 
Total  3,377 
Each  insurec!  amount  is  a  value  subject  to  implicit  or  explicit 
government  Insurance  at  the  end  of  the  1989  fiscal  year.  No 
esbmate  of  expected  taxpayer  liability  is  calculated. 
CONCLUSION 
The  stealth  budget  is enormous.  As indicated  in 
Table  1,  estimates  of  unfunded  liabilities  in  a few 
areas of the federal  budget  exceeded  $4 trillion.  Such 
disparate  areas  as civil  service  retirement  benefits, 
deposit  insurance  for thrift  accounts,  and  disposal  of 
defense-related  nuclear  waste will contribute  to future 
spending.  To  put  that  number  in perspective,  total 
federal  spending  in  1989  was $1.1  trillion  and gross 
federal  debt  at  the  end  of the  1989  fiscal year  was 
$2.9  trillion. 
The  $4  trillion  estimate  is most  likely  to  err  on 
the  low side.  Several  federal  insurance  programs  may 
produce  losses,  but  the  amount  is difficult  to  quan- 
tify. The  face value of that insurance  approached  $3.4 
trillion. 
The  stealth  budget  should  concern  macroecono- 
mists.  The  extent  to which  federal  debt  affects  con- 
sumer  spending  has been  the focus of many  empirical 
papers,  with  conflicting  evidence  produced.r6  The 
existence  of $4 trillion of unfunded  liabilities suggests 
substantial  measurement  error  in conventional  time 
series  of  federal  spending,  debt,  and  deficits.  In 
general,  any conventional  measurement  of the wealth 
or  income  effect  of  fiscal  actions  is  likely  to  be 
misspecified. 
The  stealth  budget  should  also concern  supporters 
of  balanced-budget  or  other  spending-limit  legisla- 
tion.  Current  examples  of such  proposals  would  not 
constrain  unfunded  liabilities.  As a result,  attempts 
to limit stated  spending  may  simply  change  the form 
of  spending.  For  example,  a  loan  guarantee  to  an 
insolvent  borrower  could  easily  replace  a  direct 
subsidy. 
Finally,  the  stealth  budget  should  concern  anyone 
who  believes  that  better  information  leads  to better 
public  policy  choices.  The  magnitude  of unfunded 
liabilities  suggests  that  many  decisions  by voters  and 
by  their  elected  representatives  have  been  made 
without  a  full  understanding  of  either  the  govern- 
ment’s  current  fiscal position  or  of the  full costs  of 
programs  under  consideration. 
While  the  estimates  in  this  paper  show  that 
substantial  unfunded  liabilities do exist,  the numerical 
total  should  be  recognized  as crude  at  best.  Better 
estimates  for many  programs  could  be produced  by 
the  agencies  themselves.  Their  specialists  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  programs  and  with  informed  ac- 
cess  to  relevant  data,  subject  to  comprehensive 
review  by  interested  persons  outside  the  agencies, 
could reveal  a wealth  of information.  Those  estimates 
could  then  be presented  in a consistent  format  over 
time  to  allow  easy  access  to  the  estimates  by  non- 
specialists.  Unfortunately,  as the  Appendix  suggests, 
the  very  incentives  to create  unfunded  liabilities  are 
also  incentives  to  obscure  their  costs. 
16  A survey  of  some  recent  papers  is  Barth  et  al.  (1991). 
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Why  does  the  government  have  unfunded  lia- 
bilities?  An  observer  with  little  information  might 
guess  that  simple  historical  accident  could  explain 
their  existence.  Another  guess  might  be  that  poor 
management  of  basically  sound  programs  has 
allowed  some  unfunded  liabilities to emerge.  In either 
case,  a little  tinkering  would  fix the  system,  elimi- 
nate  unfunded  liabilities,  and  make  the  budget  more 
transparent. 
The  point  of  this  section  is  to  argue  that  the 
existence  of  unfunded  liabilities  is  not  accidental. 
Instead,  the  American  political  system  has  charac- 
teristics  that  produce  incentives  for politicians-that 
is,  elected  officials  and  their  senior-appointed 
subordinates-to  deliberately  fail to fund  or to  fully 
reveal  liabilities  that  result  from  current  programs. 
To  motivate  this  interpretation,  some  key  features 
of a model  of political activity will be briefly described 
below.  A fuller discussion  of most  of these  elements 
can  be  found  in  Downs  (1957). 
Rationally  Ignorant  Voters 
Voters  acquire  information  as long  as the  marginal 
benefit  of doing so exceeds  the marginal cost.  A major 
benefit  of  voting  could  occur  if  a  particular  voter 
happened  to  cast  the  deciding  ballot  in an election. 
The  expected  value  of  voting  for  that  reason, 
however,  is very  low since  the  probability  that  a na- 
tional  election  would  be  decided  by  a single  vote  is 
extremely  low.  Other  benefits  of an individual  vote, 
such  as  expressing  an  opinion  or  promoting  good 
citizenship,  can  also  be  small.  As  a  result,  the 
marginal  benefit  of  acquiring  information  is  typi- 
cally very  small  and  voters  accordingly  acquire  little 
information  on  candidates  and  issues. 
Vote-Maximizing  Politicians 
If a politician  does  not  maximize  the  number  of 
votes  received,  he or she can be replaced  by one who 
does.  It  is  therefore  assumed  that  all  politicians 
are  vote  maximizers.  A corollary  is that  politicians 
are  primarily  motivated  by  the  prospect  of holding 
office,  rather  than  by  ideology. 
Interest  Groups 
Interest  groups  can  lower  voter  costs  of acquiring 
information  on  a small  subset  of issues,  can  inform 
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politicians  on  voter  attitudes,  and  can  acquire  and 
distribute  resources  in political  campaigns.  Interest 
groups  are  often  formed  around  issues  that  affect 
voter  incomes  and  wealth,  although  other  types  of 
interest  groups  are  also  possible. 
A political system  that  contains  the  above  elements 
can  be  expected  to behave  in a predictable  manner. 
A  few  predictions  are  given  below. 
Politicians  Respond  to  Interest  Groups 
A small  tax  on  all taxpayers  may  not  affect  many 
votes.  If  all  the  funds  are  distributed  to  a  small 
number  of  voters  represented  by  a  single  interest 
group,  however,  voting  behavior  of  that  group’s 
members  may  well  be  changed.  If the  presence  or 
absence  of that  program  makes  a large  difference  to 
the  wealth  of the  interest  group’s  members,  many 
(who  are  rationally  ignorant  on  other  issues)  will 
choose  to vote  for the  candidate  most  strongly  sup- 
porting  that  program. 
Hidden  Costs 
A politician  can gain support  by transferring  wealth 
to  members  of interest  groups.  To  the  extent  that 
the  resulting  costs  can  be  hidden  from  any  voters 
who  pay  them,  the  politician  can  benefit  from  a 
spending  program  without  suffering  adverse  conse- 
quences  from  the  resulting  taxes. 
Optimal  Ambiguity  by  Politicians 
In order  to appeal  to a wide  range  of voters,  vote- 
maximizing  politicians  will  often  “becloud  their 
policies  in a fog  of ambiguity”  (Downs,  p.  136).  By 
not  stating  positions  clearly,  a politician  can  attempt 
to appeal  to a large fraction  of the  electorate.  In con- 
trast,  a clear  statement  on  a controversial  issue  can 
often  alienate  a group  of  voters. 
Public  Interest  Rhetoric 
Voters  observing  a  politician  funding  interest 
groups  may conclude  that  his or her actions  are likely 
to  be  costly.  Politicians  will  therefore  attempt  to 
justify  their  actions  as  pursuing  the  public  interest 
whether  or not  that  interpretation  is valid.  Separating 
the  actual  effects  from  stated  purposes  of complex 
programs  can  be  so  difficult  that  many  rationally 
ignorant  voters  will  not  bother  to  try. 
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Suppose  that  a local  spending  program  enriches 
only  one  interest  group  in  a  single  congressional 
district.  The  representative  of that  district  may  sup- 
port  similar  programs  in other  districts  in exchange 
for additional  support  for the  local program.  Although 
the  support  of  other  programs  will  raise  taxes  for 
constituents,  the  support  of the  local  interest  group 
may  still provide  more  votes  than  are lost  by the  tax 
increase.  A result  is that  a program  benefiting  only 
a  few  can  obtain  broad  legislative  support. 
Summary 
These  elements  can  explain  the  workings  of  a 
political  system,  with  the  explanation  emphasizing 
the  incentives  that  lead  voters  and  politicians  to 
choose  specific  actions.  Are  these  predicted  actions 
actually  observed?  While  it  is beyond  the  scope  of 
this  article  to  survey  a vast  literature,  it is appropri- 
ate to note  that  many  writers  have produced  empirical 
evidence  that  supports  key  predictions  of the  theory 
sketched  above.  Representative  articles  include 
Peltzman  (1984),  Snyder  (1990),  and  Grier  and 
Munger  (1991).  Although  the  model  is not  a com- 
plete  description  of  the  political  system  in  its  full 
complexity,  it is sufficient  to reveal  important  incen- 
tives  for  politicians  to  create  unfunded  liabilities. 
Deposit  insurance  is perhaps  the  best  known  ex- 
ample  of a program  that  creates  unfunded  liabilities. 
It lowers  the  funding  cost  of insured  financial  inter- 
mediaries  by reducing  the  risk  of loss  to a depositor 
below  that  of alternatives  lacking  federal  insurance 
such  as  money  market  funds.  To  the  extent  that 
premiums  paid by a depository  institution  fail to cover 
expected  future  losses,  that  institution  receives  a sub- 
sidy.  Since  calculating  expected  future  losses  from 
such  a  complex  program  is  difficult,  politicians 
have  been  able to give valuable  benefits  to customers 
and  owners  of  many  financial  institutions  without 
losing  votes  for  increasing  either  taxes  or  the  re- 
ported  federal  debt.  Other  programs  that  generate 
unfunded  liabilities  similarly  hide  the  full  costs  to 
current  and  future  taxpayers. 
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